Reconciling the Public Employee Speech Doctrine and Academic Speech after Garcetti V. Ceballos by Beckstrom, Darryn Cathryn
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
2010
Reconciling the Public Employee Speech Doctrine
and Academic Speech after Garcetti V. Ceballos
Darryn Cathryn Beckstrom
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Beckstrom, Darryn Cathryn, "Reconciling the Public Employee Speech Doctrine and Academic Speech after Garcetti V. Ceballos"
(2010). Minnesota Law Review. 499.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/499
Note
Reconciling the Public Employee Speech
Doctrine and Academic Speech After
Garcetti v. Ceballos
Darryn Cathryn Beckstrom*
The public university is the quintessential marketplace of
ideas.1 Consequently, the public university occupies a unique
position in society. 2 Despite this distinction, courts do not diffe-
rentiate between academics employed by public universities
and the traditional public employee when determining the ap-
plicability of the First Amendment to public employee speech.3
In 2006, the Supreme Court held in Garcetti v. Ceballos that
public employees are not entitled to First Amendment protec-
tion for speech arising from their official duties. 4 The Court
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1. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (ex-
plaining the importance of academic freedom and the existence of a market-
place of ideas in the public university); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S.
234, 250 (1957) (explaining the importance of intellectual freedom within the
public university).
2. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003) ("Universities oc-
cupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition."). Most other public insti-
tutions do not adhere to this principle. See Paul Horwitz, Universities as First
Amendment Institutions: Some Easy Answers and Hard Questions, 54 UCLA
L. REV. 1497, 1516-20 (2007) (noting that courts may defer to the decision-
making processes of the public university because of its unique values, capa-
bilities, and goals).
3. Cf. Horwitz, supra note 2, at 1524 (noting that the First Amendment
differentiates between public and private employees).
4. 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) ("We hold that when public employees make
statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as
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specifically declined to decide whether Garcetti's holding would
apply to academic speech.5 Many people question the effect this
case will have on academic speech made in public colleges and
universities.6
The Court explained that the facts in Garcetti did not re-
quire it to address whether the holding applies to academic
speech,7 but lower federal courts have utilized Garcetti to re-
strict the First Amendment rights of faculty employed by public
universities and colleges. 8 It is plausible that federal courts will
eventually uniformly apply Garcetti to faculty members who
engage in teaching and scholarship in public institutions of
higher education.9 Such an application would frustrate the
fundamental purposes of the public university.10
The placement of academic speech within the public em-
ployee speech doctrine demonstrates the inflexibility of the doc-
trine in recognizing the varying characteristics of public em-
ployee speech. The doctrine blindly places speech within a
citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate
their communications from employer discipline.").
5. Id. at 425.
6. See, e.g., Kevin L. Cope, Defending the Ivory Tower: A Twenty-First
Century Approach to the Pickering-Connick Doctrine and Public Higher Edu-
cation Faculty after Garcetti, 33 J.C. & U.L. 313, 351-52 (2007) (considering
possible legal approaches to academic speech); Larry D. Spurgeon, A Tran-
scendent Value: The Quest to Safeguard Academic Freedom, 34 J.C. & U.L.
111, 164-67 (2007) (examining the "future landscape [of] academic freedom
after Garcetti").
7. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425.
8. See Renken v. Gregory, 541 F.3d 769, 775 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that
a professor's criticism of a university's handling of funds was made "pursuant
to his official duties and therefore was not protected by the First Amend-
ment"); Piggee v. Carl Sandburg Coll., 464 F.3d 667, 672 (7th Cir. 2006) (dis-
cussing the influence of Garcetti on the court's decision to refuse First
Amendment protection to a cosmetology instructor's speech condemning ho-
mosexuality); Hong v. Grant, 516 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1168 (C.D. Cal. 2007)
(holding that a professor's remarks regarding faculty review were made "pur-
suant to his official duties as a faculty member and therefore [deserving of]
First Amendment protection").
9. See Leonard M. Niehoff, Peculiar Marketplace: Applying Garcetti v.
Ceballos in the Public Higher Education Context, 35 J.C. & U.L. 75, 97 (2008)
("Garcetti may prove particularly important in the higher education environ-
ment .... ).
10. See Jennifer Elrod, Academics, Public Employee Speech, and the Pub-
lic University, 22 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 62 (2003) ("At the college level, the
[public employee speech] doctrine does not respond well to the function of the
institution of public higher education that is based upon the concept and prac-
tice of teaching and research freedom, an intellectual marketplace of ideas and
an experiment station of the mind.").
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dichotomy, thereby classifying speech as either public employee
speech or nonpublic employee speech." The public employee
speech doctrine, though, is inappropriate for determining the
amount of First Amendment protection afforded to academic
speech in the public university.'2 When the government creates
a public university, the government inherently creates an insti-
tution where academic freedom is present, regardless of wheth-
er the government bargained for it.13 This institution fosters
discussion of competing ideas.14 Courts prevent this from occur-
ring when they apply the public employee speech doctrine to
academic speech.
This Note argues that applying the public employee speech
doctrine to academic speech is inappropriate because a public
university is more akin to a forum for the dissemination of
ideas than a traditional public employer, which the government
created for the purposes of disseminating a coherent govern-
ment message. Part I discusses the Garcetti decision along with
the government speech and public forum doctrines as tools for
regulating academic speech within the public university. This
Part also considers the Supreme Court's use of the principle of
academic freedom to treat the public university differently from
other public institutions. Part II critiques federal courts' appli-
cation of the public employee speech doctrine to academic
speech. Part III uses the public forum doctrine to create a
framework that would allow the public university to regulate
the speech of its faculty members while simultaneously afford-
ing faculty necessary First Amendment rights. Unlike the pub-
lic employee speech doctrine, a public forum approach to aca-
demic speech balances the interests of both the public
university and individual faculty members, and is more consis-
tent with existing First Amendment jurisprudence.
11. See Ramona L. Paetzold, When Are Public Employees Not Really Pub-
lic Employees? In the Aftermath of Garcetti v. Ceballos, 7 FIRST AMENDMENT
L. REV. 92, 95-97 (2008) (explaining that the public employee-private citizen
dichotomy created by the public employee speech doctrine poses substantial
interpretation problems in public employee speech cases).
12. See, e.g., Ailsa W. Chang, Note, Resuscitating the Constitutional
"Theory" of Academic Freedom: A Search for a Standard Beyond Pickering and
Connick, 53 STAN. L. REV. 915, 937-47 (2001) (discussing the insufficiency of
the public employee speech doctrine in the public university context).
13. Cf. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 425 (2006) (suggesting the aca-
demic freedom inherent in "scholarship [and] classroom instruction" is a con-
stitutional value).
14. E.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (discussing
academic institutions as a marketplace of ideas).
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I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND PUBLIC EMPLOYEE
SPEECH
The First Amendment provides that the government "shall
make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech. . . ."15 De-
spite this seemingly simple prohibition on government conduct,
First Amendment jurisprudence is exceedingly complex.16 This
jurisprudence carves out different doctrines for assessing the
amount of First Amendment protection afforded to speech.' 7
These doctrines give varying levels of protection to speech de-
pending on factors such as the identity of the speaker, the loca-
tion of the speech, and the inherent value of the speech to socie-
ty.18
The Supreme Court created the public employee speech
doctrine to determine the amount of First Amendment protec-
tion afforded to speech made by public employees.' 9 While indi-
viduals do not shed their First Amendment rights when they
work for the government, 20 the government has the right to
limit individuals' right to free speech when these individuals
become public employees. 21 This Part discusses the public em-
ployee speech doctrine both prior to and after Garcetti and the
Court's use of the government speech doctrine to reason that
public employee speech belongs to the government. This Part
also discusses courts' use of the government speech and public
forum doctrines to regulate speech made within public univer-
sities. Finally, this Part considers the concept of academic free-
15. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
16. See, e.g., Note, Strict Scrutiny in the Middle Forum, 122 HARv. L. REV.
2140, 2154 (2009) ("[Glovernment speech ... is a complex and muddled area of
First Amendment jurisprudence . . . .").
17. See, e.g., Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422-23 (discussing the public employee
speech doctrine); Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 559 (2005)
(discussing the government speech doctrine); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (discussing the public forum doctrine);
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563-64
(1980) (providing a balancing test to determine whether speech is prohibited
under the commercial speech doctrine); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24
(1973) (providing a multifactor test to determine whether speech is prohibited
under the obscenity doctrine).
18. Cf. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 420-21 (calling both the location and subject
matter of the speech "nondispositive").
19. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) ('The prob-
lem ... is to arrive at a balance between the interests [of a] citizen, in com-
menting upon matters of public concern[,] and the interest of the State .....
20. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972).
21. Cf. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 417 (explaining that public employees do not
surrender all of their First Amendment rights).
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dom, which grants unique protection to academic speech, and
its importance within First Amendment jurisprudence.
A. THE EVOLUTION OF THE PUBLIC EMPLOYEE SPEECH
DOCTRINE
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Garcetti, courts
followed the Pickering-Connick test to determine when public
employee speech is protected under the First Amendment. 22 In
Pickering v. Board of Education, a school district fired a teach-
er for writing a letter to a local newspaper critical of the school
board's proposed tax increase to raise education revenue. 23 The
Court set forth a balancing test to decide when government
employers could discipline public employees for their speech
without violating the First Amendment. 24 Under this test,
courts must balance the free speech interests of the public em-
ployee discussing matters of public concern with the interests
of the government "in promoting the efficiency of the public
services it performs through its employees."25 The Court did not
explicitly state what constituted a matter of public concern. 26
Nonetheless, in applying this test, the Court considered wheth-
er the employee spoke on a matter of public concern. 27 If the
employee did not speak on a matter of public concern, the gov-
ernment employer is free to discipline the public employee
without fear of violating the employee's First Amendment
rights.28 But if the employee spoke on a matter of public con-
cern, then the court must inquire whether the employer had
"an adequate justification for treating the employee differently"
from a private citizen. 29 If adequate justification does not exist,
the speech is entitled to First Amendment protection.30
22. See id. at 417-20 (discussing the Pickering-Connick test).
23. 391 U.S. at 564.
24. See id. at 568 (discussing the Court's balancing test used to determine
when the interests of the government outweigh the free speech interests of the
public employee).
25. Id.
26. See id. at 571-72 (confirming only that school system funds are of pub-
lic concern).
27. See id. at 574 (concluding the teacher's speech arose from his member-
ship in the general public).
28. See id. (discussing the interplay between dismissal from employment
and inhibiting speech); see also Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006)
("A government has broader discretion to restrict speech when it acts in its
role as employer. . . .").
29. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418.
30. Id. (restricting employee speech only as "necessary for their employers
1206 [94:1202
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A lingering question left by Pickering was whether the de-
cision established a threshold test when it explained the First
Amendment protects public employee speech on matters of pub-
lic concern. 31 The Court quelled this uncertainty over two dec-
ades later in Connick v. Myers by answering this question in
the affirmative. 32 The Connick Court noted that public employ-
ers should "enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices" with-
out fear of violating the First Amendment when public em-
ployees do not speak on "matter[s] of political, social, or other
concern to the community." 33 In determining whether govern-
ment employees' speech is of public concern, courts must con-
sider the "content, form, and context" of the speech.34 Even
though the Connick Court provided some clarification on the
public concern requirement under the public employee speech
doctrine, federal courts continue to have difficulty determining
what constitutes a matter of public concern.35
Since the Supreme Court's creation of the Pickering-
Connick test, lower federal courts also struggled with the un-
answered question of whether speech made by a public em-
ployee in the course of his official duties deserved First
Amendment protection. 36 The Court resolved this question in
Garcetti by holding that employees are not entitled to First
Amendment protection for speech arising from their official du-
ties.37 In Garcetti, Richard Ceballos worked as a calendar depu-
ty in the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office. 38 As
to operate efficiently and effectively").
31. See, e.g., Joseph 0. Oluwole, The Pickering Balancing Test and Public
Employment Free Speech Jurisprudence: The Approaches of Federal Circuit
Courts of Appeals, 46 DUQ. L. REV. 133, 140 (2008) (discussing the preliminary
determination future courts had to make before applying the Pickering test).
32. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
33. Id. at 146.
34. Id. at 147-48.
35. See, e.g., Karin B. Hoppmann, Note, Concern with Public Concern:
Toward a Better Definition of the Pickering/Connick Threshold Test, 50 VAND.
L. REV. 993, 996 (1997) ("To the great consternation of lower courts ... the
Court has failed to provide a clear definition of 'public concern."').
36. Compare Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1176 (9th Cir. 2004) (re-
jecting a per se rule prohibiting public employees from seeking First Amend-
ment protection for statements made during the course of their official duties),
with id. at 1188 n.2 (O'Scannlain, J., concurring) ("In any event, such deep
confusion within the circuits over the scope of Connick-indeed, over the scope
of their own cases interpreting Connick-seems a clarion call for higher re-
view.").
37. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 422 (2006).
38. Id. at 413.
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part of his duties, defense attorneys often requested that Cebal-
los investigate portions of pending cases.39 In this case, a de-
fense attorney asked Ceballos to investigate the adequacy of a
search warrant. 40 Ceballos determined there were substantial
inadequacies in the search warrant, and he informed his supe-
riors of these inadequacies in a memo. 4 1 In a meeting with dis-
trict attorneys, Ceballos defended his memo and an argument
ensued.42 The district attorney's office subsequently disciplined
Ceballos for his remarks. 43 The Court held that Ceballos was
not entitled to First Amendment protection for his speech be-
cause he made the speech pursuant to his official duties as a
calendar deputy; therefore, he was not acting as a private citi-
zen.44
The Garcetti Court discussed several reasons for holding
that government employees have no First Amendment protec-
tion for speech arising from their official duties. 45 First, public
employees "by necessity must accept certain limitations
on ... [their] freedom" when they assume government employ-
ment.46 These limitations are permissible because there is no
constitutional right to government employment.47 Second, gov-
ernment employers need to control the actions of their em-
ployees in order to maintain efficiency. 48 Public employers can-
not spend time defending every adverse employment action
taken against a public employee for an employee's speech.49
Third, unlike private employees, public employees "often occu-
py trusted positions in society," and employees can impair this
trust when they deviate from a prescribed government mes-
sage.50 Finally, regulation of public employee speech is impor-
tant because public employees "can express views that contra-
vene governmental policies or impair the proper performance of
39. Id. at 414.
40. Id. at 413.
41. Id. at 414.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 415.
44. Id. at 424.
45. See id. at 418.
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass.
1892) (holding the petitioner had "no constitutional right to be a policeman").
48. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418.
49. Id. at 418-19 (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983)).
50. Id. at 419.
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governmental functions."51 Requiring public employees to dis-
seminate predetermined government messages prevents the de-
liverance of inconsistent messages. 52
Justice Souter wrote a dissent in Garcetti and explained
that the Court's decision could have serious implications for
academic speech because academics employed by public univer-
sities engage in teaching and scholarship pursuant to their offi-
cial duties. 53 Scholars have echoed Justice Souter's concerns. 54
Generally, the Supreme Court's refinement of the public
employee speech doctrine over the past several decades sug-
gests the Court's willingness to narrow the free speech rights of
public employees and defer to public employers in matters per-
taining to the daily operations of government institutions.55
This deference to public employers is partially the result of the
Garcetti Court's use of the government speech doctrine to justi-
fy government regulation of public employee speech.56 Under
this doctrine, the government can regulate the viewpoint of
speech belonging to the government without violating the First
Amendment.57
B. THE GOVERNMENT SPEECH DOCTRINE
The Garcetti Court used the government speech doctrine to
reason that public employees are not entitled to First Amend-
ment protection for speech made pursuant to their official du-
51. Id.
52. See id. at 422-23 (discussing employers' interest in consistent official
communication).
53. Id. at 438 (Souter, J., dissenting).
54. See, e.g., Elrod, supra note 10, at 62 (arguing that courts should create
a "separate standard for academic speech within the pantheon of free speech
jurisprudence"); Chang, supra note 12, at 937-47 (discussing undesirable im-
plications of applying another version of the public employee speech doctrine
in academic contexts).
55. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983) ("[A]bsent the most
unusual circumstances, a federal court is not the appropriate forum in which
to review the wisdom of a personnel decision taken by a public agency alleged-
ly in reaction to the employee's behavior.").
56. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422 ("Our holding ... is supported by the
emphasis of our precedents on affording government employers sufficient dis-
cretion to manage their operations [and thus official employee speech].").
57. See id. at 423 ("To hold otherwise would be to demand permanent
judicial intervention in the conduct of governmental operations to a degree in-
consistent with sound principles of federalism and the separation of powers.").
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ties.5 8 Under the government speech doctrine, the First
Amendment does not apply to speech when the speech belongs
to the government. 59 In Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Associ-
ation the Court explained that speech belongs to the govern-
ment "[wihen . .. the government sets the overall message to be
communicated and approves every word that is dissemi-
nated."60 The development of the government speech doctrine is
still in its early stages.6 1 As a result, the Court has not articu-
lated a clear definition of government speech.62 This may ex-
plain why the Garcetti Court discussed the application of the
doctrine to public employee speech in dicta. 63 Federal circuits
currently disagree over what factors to emphasize when classi-
fying speech as either private or government speech. 64 These
circuits agree, though, that government speech has "a clearly
governmental source" to facilitate attribution of this speech. 65
In Garcetti, the Court implicitly relied on Rust v. Sulli-
van,6 6 a government speech decision decided over a decade ear-
lier by the Court, to explain that public employees are not en-
titled to First Amendment protection for speech made pursuant
to their official duties.67 In Rust, recipients of Title X funds
challenged the constitutionality of the government funding as
viewpoint discrimination because it forbade recipients from
counseling patients on abortion as a means of family planning
58. See id. at 421; see also Gia B. Lee, First Amendment Enforcement in
Government Institutions and Programs, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1691, 1709 (2009)
(discussing the Court's use of the government speech doctrine in Garcetti).
59. See Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech Is Both Private
and Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 611-15 (2008) (describing the gov-
ernment speech doctrine); see also Helen Norton, The Measure of Government
Speech: Identifying Expression's Source, 88 B.U. L. REV. 587, 597-98 (2008)
(discussing when speech is considered government speech).
60. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 562 (2005).
61. See, e.g., Corbin, supra note 59, at 611 (calling the government speech
doctrine a "recent development").
62. See id. at 612 ("While the existence of the government speech doctrine
is firmly established, its contours are not.").
63. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421-22.
64. See Lilia Lim, Comment, Four-Factor Disaster: Courts Should Aban-
don the Circuit Test for Distinguishing Government Speech from Private
Speech, 83 WASH. L. REV. 569, 585-94 (2008).
65. Norton, supra note 59, at 598.
66. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
67. The majority decision in Garcetti does not explicitly state that it is re-
lying on Rust. Rather, Garcetti relies on the Court's decision in Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia, which relied on Rust. See Garcetti,
547 U.S. at 422 (citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515
U.S. 819, 833 (1995)).
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or referring patients to abortion providers. 68 The Court held the
restrictions did not violate the recipients' First Amendment
rights because the speech was government speech.69 This
speech was government speech because the government paid
for the speech and controlled the messages delivered by funding
recipients through regulations on Title X funding.70
Similar to the federal government in Rust, the county paid
for Garcetti's speech because Garcetti made the speech while in
the course of his official duties. His speech therefore "ow[ed] its
existence" to his job as a public employee instead of his status
as a private citizen and merely demonstrated what the county
attorney's office created.71 The county also selected the message
that calendar deputies were to deliver through their prescribed
duties. 72 Consequently, the Court reasoned the speech was gov-
ernment speech, thereby removing it from the purview of First
Amendment protection. 73
In contrast to Rust, the Court did not apply the govern-
ment speech doctrine in Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez be-
cause the government provided funding to private speakers to
convey private messages instead of a government message.74 In
Velazquez, Congress provided funds under the Legal Services
Corporation to organizations that "hire and supervise lawyers
to provide free legal assistance to indigent clients."75 If organi-
zations accepted the funding, the lawyers could not argue be-
fore a court "that a state statute conflicts with a federal statute
or that either a state or federal statute by its terms or in its
application is violative of the United States Constitution."76 A
group of attorneys sued, claiming the condition violated their
First Amendment free speech rights because the condition im-
posed a viewpoint restriction on their speech.77 The Supreme
Court held the condition on funding violated the attorneys'
First Amendment rights because the attorneys' speech was pri-
vate and not governmental in nature even though the govern-
68. Rust, 500 U.S. at 179-80.
69. See id. at 193-94.
70. See id.
71. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421-22.
72. See id. at 421.
73. See id. at 421-22.
74. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 542 (2001).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 537.
77. Id.
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ment paid for the speech.78 Overall, given the Court's reasoning
in Velazquez, the applicability of the government speech doc-
trine hinges on whether the government funded a speaker's
private message or a government message. The First Amend-
ment protects only the former messages.
Federal courts are beginning to use the Garcetti Court's
dicta regarding government speech as the basis for holding that
speech made pursuant to a public employee's official duties is
unprotected by the First Amendment. 79 In Khan v. Fernandez-
Rundle, the Eleventh Circuit held that an assistant state at-
torney was not entitled to First Amendment protection for
statements he made in court because he was an agent of the
government and not a private citizen when he made the state-
ments.80 The state owned the speech since Khan's speech ex-
isted merely because of "his role as the government's lawyer."81
The state could therefore regulate the speech at its discretion.82
The Third Circuit used similar reasoning in Reilly v. City of At-
lantic City when it held that a police officer did not speak pur-
suant to his official duties when giving testimony related to an
investigation of department misconduct and therefore did not
foreclose his speech to First Amendment protection.83
The government speech doctrine is unique because it al-
lows the government to regulate speech based on its view-
point.84 The First Amendment does not usually permit this type
of regulation. 85 The Rust Court explained the government could
decide to fund a program "it believes to be in the public inter-
est" while not funding an alternative program.86 The Court
stated that when the government decides to choose one pro-
gram over another, the government's actions do not conflict
with the First Amendment.87 The government "has merely cho-
78. Id. at 542 ("[The salient point is that ... the [Legal Services Corpora-
tion] program was designed to facilitate private speech, not to promote a go-
vernmental message.").
79. See JoNel Newman, Will Teachers Shed Their First Amendment
Rights at the Schoolhouse Gate? The Eleventh Circuit's Post-Garcetti Juri-
sprudence, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 761, 789 (2009).
80. 287 F. App'x 50, 53 (11th Cir. 2007).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. 532 F.3d 216, 228 (3d Cir. 2008).
84. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991).
85. See Sheldon Nahmod, Academic Freedom and the Post-Garcetti Blues,
7 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 54, 69 (2008).
86. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 193.
87. Id.
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sen to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other."8 8 Under
this reasoning, if courts classify academic speech made within
the public university as government speech, then the govern-
ment could regulate the viewpoint of academic speech.89
Overall, the public employee speech doctrine, relying on
the government speech doctrine, allows the government to re-
gulate public employee speech. Courts, though, often discuss
the government speech doctrine in conjunction with the public
forum doctrine because the government creates forums in
which speech can exist. Courts frequently subject speech made
within the public university to the public forum doctrine.
Therefore, a discussion of government speech is not complete
without a discussion of the public forum doctrine.
C. THE PUBLIC FORUm DOCTRINE
This section provides a brief overview of the public forum
doctrine, the Supreme Court's use of this doctrine in education-
al settings, and the regulation of the quality of speech within a
forum.
1. The Public Forum Analysis
The Garcetti Court used the government speech doctrine to
justify public employers' regulation of public employee speech.
But courts frequently rely on the public forum doctrine to regu-
late speech in the public university context because the public
university often creates forums within the institution.90 Under
the public forum doctrine, the level of First Amendment protec-
tion afforded to speech within the forum depends on a forum's
characteristics.91 Courts often divide forums into three types:
public, limited, and nonpublic. 92 Courts consider context when
88. Id.
89. Cf. Nahmod, supra note 85, at 69 ("The First Amendment consequence
is that the government should not be allowed to engage in viewpoint discrimi-
nation by punishing faculty because of what they say in the classroom or write
in their scholarship.").
90. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.
819, 830 (1995) (using a public forum analysis to determine the constitutional-
ity of viewpoint discrimination within a student fee system); Widmar v. Vin-
cent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (using a public forum analysis to prohibit content
discrimination of student organization access to university facilities).
91. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45
(1983).
92. See id. at 45-46.
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classifying the forum created by the government. 93 This evalua-
tion considers the forum's purpose, the government's intention
to open the forum to public speech, and the location of the fo-
rum.94
The public forum provides speakers with the most First
Amendment protection.95 Individuals traditionally use this fo-
rum for "purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts be-
tween citizens, and discussing public questions."96 Common ex-
amples of public forums include streets and parks.97 The
government can place time, place, and manner restrictions on
speech made in a public forum, as long as these restrictions are
content-neutral and narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
state interest.98 The state can also place content restrictions on
speech made within this forum, but these restrictions must be
subject to strict scrutiny.99
On the opposite side of the spectrum is the nonpublic fo-
rum.100 The nonpublic forum is a forum the government has not
designated to be public.101 The government can place reasona-
ble time, place, and manner restrictions on speech within this
forum.10 2 The government can also regulate content within this
forum as long as the regulation is reasonable and viewpoint
neutral.103 Courts classify the public school classroom as a non-
public forum.104
Somewhere between the public forum and the nonpublic
forum is the limited public forum. 05 The limited public forum
is traditionally open to speech like a public forum, but occasion-
ally, the government regulates speech within this forum. 06 The
government is able to apply reasonable time, place, and man-
93. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 679-
80 (1992).
94. See id. at 679-80.
95. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
96. Id.
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. See id. at 46.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267 (1988)
(holding that a school publication is a nonpublic forum).
105. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
106. See id. at 45-46.
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ner restrictions on speech made within this forum as long as
the government narrowly tailors content regulations to serve a
significant government interest.107 Courts frequently classify
public universities as limited public forums because these insti-
tutions are often open to public speech but the university some-
times limits speech within this forum. For example, in Widmar
v. Vincent, the Supreme Court held that a university that opens
its facilities to student groups could not engage in content dis-
crimination by excluding religious groups from using its facili-
ties unless the university narrowly tailored the restriction to
serve a compelling state interest.108
A limited public forum within a public university can be
more than meeting spaces. In Rosenberger v. University of Vir-
ginia, the University of Virginia created a funding system that
required students to pay a mandatory student activity fee.109
When a religious student newspaper applied for student activi-
ty funds, the university denied the student organization's re-
quest because of a policy prohibiting the funding of religious
promotion.110 The Court held that the denial of funds violated
the students' First Amendment rights because the university
engaged in viewpoint discrimination within a limited forum.",
The university created a limited public forum through the stu-
dent fee system because "the University [did] not itself speak or
subsidize transmittal of a message it favors but instead ex-
pend[ed] funds to encourage a diversity of views from private
speakers."112 In essence, while the public university can engage
in content discrimination within a limited public forum, pro-
vided such restrictions are narrowly tailored to serve a compel-
ling interest, the university cannot engage in viewpoint dis-
crimination within this forum.
2. Forums in an Educational Setting
Courts frequently apply the public forum doctrine to the
educational setting. These courts designate forums within col-
leges as public or limited public forums and forums within ele-
mentary and secondary schools as limited public or nonpublic
107. See id. at 46.
108. 454 U.S. 263, 267-68 (1981).
109. 515 U.S. 819, 824 (1995).
110. Id. at 825.
111. See id. at 837.
112. Id. at 834.
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forums.113 This differentiation is permissible because children
are minors while college students are usually adults. 114 The
government may limit the First Amendment rights of children,
but it must afford the full protection of this amendment to
adults.115 In Tinker v. Des Moines School District, the first case
to address student free speech rights, Justice Black famously
stated that children do not "shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gates."116 In
this same case, though, the Supreme Court held that schools
could limit student speech when the speech causes a substan-
tial disruption to the classroom environment or the speech in-
fringes on the rights of other students.117
Unlike most public institutions, elementary and secondary
schools can regulate the content of students' speech because
courts often classify forums within these schools as nonpublic
forums as long as the regulation is reasonable."18 In Hazelwood
School District v. Kuhlmeier, a group of students participating
on the student newspaper, Spectrum, wrote stories pertaining
to student pregnancies and students' experiences with their
parents' divorces.119 Before the newspaper went to print, the fa-
culty advisor of the newspaper removed the stories from the
newspaper, explaining the stories were inappropriate for the
student newspaper.120 The students claimed that the school vi-
olated their First Amendment rights by removing the stories.121
The Supreme Court, applying a public forum analysis, held
that the student newspaper was a nonpublic forum, and there-
fore, the school could exercise editorial control over the news-
113. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhimeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
114. See Alison Lima, Note, Shedding First Amendment Rights at the
Classroom Door?: The Effects of Garcetti and Mayer on Education in Public
Schools, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 173, 173 (2008) ("First Amendment rights for
students and teachers have always been more limited in schools than in public
generally, as schools have legitimate interests in maintaining order, discipline,
and productive pedagogical environments.").
115. See id.
116. 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969).
117. See id. at 509, 513.
118. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 484 U.S. at 267 (holding that speech restric-
tions do not have to be viewpoint-neutral when in a nonpublic forum and re-
lated to a legitimate pedagogical purpose).
119. See id. at 263.
120. See id.
121. See id. at 264.
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paper as long as there was a legitimate pedagogical purpose for
the regulation. 122
College students are often afforded more speech rights
than grade school students. In Papish v. Board of Curators of
the University of Missouri, the Supreme Court held the Univer-
sity of Missouri violated a graduate student's First Amendment
rights when it disciplined the student for publishing a newspa-
per with a front cover containing a "political cartoon previously
printed in another newspaper depicting policemen raping the
Statute of Liberty and the Goddess of Justice" and exple-
tives. 123 While the University claimed that the speech was "in-
decent," the Court held that "the mere dissemination of ideas-
no matter how offensive to good taste-on a state university
campus [sic] may not be shut off in the name alone of 'conven-
tions of decency."1 24 The Court decided Papish before its exten-
sive use of the public forum doctrine, but the case demonstrates
the greater amount of free speech rights afforded to college stu-
dents when compared to grade school students.
3. Regulating the Quality of Speech Within the Forum
In addition to regulating content, a public forum analysis
approach to academic speech may allow universities to regulate
the quality of academic speech. In National Endowment for the
Arts v. Finley, the Supreme Court considered the constitution-
ality of a federal grant program created by Congress and admi-
nistered by the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) to
award funds to artists in an effort to promote the arts. 125 The
Court, deviating from its analytical scheme in Rosenberger, did
not decide whether the government created a forum when it
created the selection process employed by NEA.126 Instead, the
Finley Court distinguished the case from Rosenberger by ex-
plaining that unlike the student fee distribution process within
122. See id. at 273.
123. 410 U.S. 667, 667 (1973) (per curiam).
124. Id. at 670.
125. 524 U.S. 569, 573 ("The enabling statute vests the NEA with substan-
tial discretion to award grants; it identifies only the broadest funding priori-
ties, including 'artistic and cultural significance, giving emphasis to American
creativity and cultural diversity,' 'professional excellence,' and the encourage-
ment of 'public knowledge, education, understanding, and appreciation of the
arts."').
126. See Alan Brownstein, The Nonforum as a First Amendment Category:
Bringing Order Out of the Chaos of Free Speech Cases Involving School-
Sponsored Activities, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 717, 788 (2009).
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a university, the NEA employed a "competitive process" where-
by the NEA is required to make judgments regarding the quali-
ty of the work. 127 The Court explained that the federal govern-
ment "may allocate competitive funding according to criteria
that would be impermissible were direct regulation of
speech . . . at stake."12 8 As a result, any use of content consider-
ations is merely a "consequence of the nature of arts fund-
ing."129 Overall, Finley provides a way for the government to
regulate the quality of speech without violating the First
Amendment so long as the government provides clearly articu-
lated criteria to determine the quality of such speech, and the
nature of the speech requires the government to make decisions
based on the quality. 130
Courts use the government speech and public forum doc-
trines to regulate speech made or facilitated by the govern-
ment, respectively. Sometimes, though, the Supreme Court re-
cognizes that regulation of speech may be deserving of greater
scrutiny because of the speech's value to society. The Court
used the principle of academic freedom to justify why it can
treat the public university differently than other public institu-
tions.
D. ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Academic freedom is essential to the functioning of the
public university. 131 In 1915, the American Association of Uni-
versity Professors (AAUP) released its seminal statement on
the existence of academic freedom in the university. The state-
ment declared that "[a]cademic freedom .. . comprises three
elements: freedom of inquiry and research; freedom of teaching
within the university or college; and freedom of extramural ut-
127. Finley, 524 U.S. at 586 ("The NEA's mandate is to make esthetic
judgments, and the inherently content-based 'excellence' threshold for NEA
support sets it apart from the subsidy at issue in Rosenberger."); see also Lack-
land H. Bloom, Jr., NEA v. Finley: A Decision in Search of a Rationale, 77
WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 12 (1999) (discussing how the Court in Finley distinguished
its decision from Rosenberger).
128. Finley, 524 U.S. at 587-88.
129. Id. at 585.
130. See id. at 585-88; see also Scott Ahmad, Comment, Can the First
Amendment Stop Content Restriction in State Film Incentive Programs?, 16
UCLA ENT. L. REV. 395, 427 (2009).
131. See AM. ASS'N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, 1915 DECLARATION OF PRIN-
CIPLES ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND ACADEMIC TENURE 292 (1915), available
at http://www.aaup.org/NR/rdonlyres/A6520A9D-A9A-47B3-B550CO06B5B22
4E7/0/1915Declaration.pdf.
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terance and action."132 Thirty-five years later, the AAUP reite-
rated the role of academic freedom at colleges and universities
with another release. 133 Despite these statements, the Supreme
Court did not address the concept of academic freedom until
the 1950s. Since then, the Court has strongly noted the impor-
tance of academic freedom and the marketplace of ideas within
public universities.
The Court first discussed the importance of academic free-
dom in Sweezy v. New Hampshire.134 The Court explained that
the necessity of academic freedom to academics within a public
university is obvious because "[t]o impose any strait jacket
upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities
would imperil the future of our Nation."135 The Court noted
there were four essential freedoms of public universities. These
freedoms include the freedom to "determine for itself on aca-
demic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it
shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study." 3 6 The
Court reiterated its view of academic freedom in Keyishian v.
Board of Regents.137 In Keyishian, the Court explained that the
public university is a "marketplace of ideas" and because of
this, academic freedom is a "special concern" of the First
Amendment.138 The Court also noted that courts should closely
scrutinize laws that restrict this freedom.139
The Court has clearly acknowledged and embraced the ex-
istence of academic freedom within the public university. How-
ever, within the last few decades, scholars have debated
whether academic freedom is a constitutional right.140 The
132. Id.
133. See AM. Ass'N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, 1940 STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES
ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE 3 (1940), available at http://www.aaup
.org/NR/rdonlyres/EBBlB330-33D3-4A51-B534-CEEOC7A90DAB/0/1940Statement
ofPrinciplesonAcademicFreedomandTenure.pdf.
134. 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 263 (citation omitted).
137. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
138. See id. at 603.
139. See id.
140. See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A "Special Concern of the
First Amendment," 99 YALE L.J. 251, 256-58 (1989) (discussing the struggle of
courts to define the right of academic freedom); Todd A. DeMitchell & Vincent
J. Connelly, Academic Freedom and the Public School Teacher: An Exploratory
Study of Perceptions, Policy, and the Law, 2007 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 83, 83 ("De-
spite academic freedom's influence on policy, there is no black letter law defi-
nition of this right.").
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Court has not addressed this issue. 141 Regardless of its classifi-
cation, academic freedom appears to be a notion that provides
some deference to the public university.142 The Court's relative-
ly recent decision in Grutter v. Bollingerl43 solidifies the Su-
preme Court's recognition of academic freedom in higher educa-
tion. 144 In Grutter, Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court,
explained: "We have long recognized that, given the important
purpose of public education and the expansive freedoms of
speech and thought associated with the university environ-
ment, universities occupy a special niche in our constitutional
tradition."145 This special preference afforded to academic free-
dom existed prior to Grutter. In Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke, Justice Powell explained, that "[a]cademic
freedom, though not a specifically enumerated constitutional
right, long has been viewed as a special concern of the First
Amendment."146
Overall, the government can regulate speech using the
government speech and the public employee speech doctrine.
But courts must use caution when applying these doctrines to
speech occurring within the public university because of the
principle of academic freedom. This Note proceeds with the un-
derstanding that regardless of whether academic freedom is a
constitutional right, the First Amendment grants special prefe-
rence to academic freedom. As such, courts must use caution
when applying First Amendment jurisprudence in the same
manner to both the public university and other public institu-
tions.
141. See DeMitchell & Connelly, supra note 140, at 84.
142. See Emergency Coal. to Defend Educ. Travel v. U.S. Dep't of the Trea-
sury, 545 F.3d 4, 18-20 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Silberman, J., concurring) (explain-
ing that academic freedom is not a constitutional right but rather a doctrine
that allows courts to provide deference to the public university as an institu-
tion).
143. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
144. See J. Peter Byrne, The Threat to Constitutional Academic Freedom,
31 J.C. & U.L. 79, 116-18 (2004) (discussing the impact of Justice O'Connor's
opinion for the Court in Grutter on the academic freedom debate occurring in
the nation's colleges and universities).
145. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328-29.
146. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978).
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II. RECONCILING THE PUBLIC EMPLOYEE SPEECH
DOCTRINE AND ACADEMIC SPEECH
This Part analyzes the application of the public employee
speech doctrine to academic speech. In determining its applica-
bility, this Part discusses an important question: is the public
university a disseminator of a coherent message 47 or more
akin to a forum for the dissemination of various ideas?148 This
Part concludes that the application of the public employee
speech doctrine to academic speech is inappropriate because
academic speech is not government speech. Accordingly, this
Part proceeds by considering the problems with the existing
public employee speech doctrine as applied to academic speech
and then analyzes the application of the government speech
and public forum doctrines to academic speech.
A. PROBLEMS WITH THE EXISTING PUBLIC EMPLOYEE SPEECH
DOCTRINE
This section explains the difficulties of applying the public
employee speech doctrine to academic speech. While the diffi-
culties discussed in this section are not necessarily unique to
academic speech, this discussion demonstrates the broader dif-
ficulties of applying this doctrine to public employee speech.
These difficulties arise in the context of the public employee
speech doctrine's public concern and official duties tests and
viewpoint discrimination.
1. Public Concern Test
It is unclear what constitutes a matter of public concern
under the public employee speech doctrine. 149 This is particu-
147. See, e.g., Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of
Government Speech, 86 IOwA L. REV. 1377, 1436 (2001) ("The very idea of uni-
versity or government speech makes no sense unless the message thus com-
municated is the university's own view and a product of its purposeful efforts
to communicate it as such . .. [and] one might well conclude that many of the
acts engaged in by universities will not constitute government speech."); Paul
M. Secunda, The Solomon Amendment, Expressive Associations, and Public
Employment, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1767, 1813 (2007) ("[N]o one would seriously
argue that public university professors are hired to parrot a particular gov-
ernment message.").
148. See Nahmod, supra note 85, at 69 ("The university classroom is an in-
tentionally created educational forum for the enabling of professorial (and
student) speech, per the rationale of Rosenberger.").
149. See, e.g., Stephen Allred, From Connick to Confusion: The Struggle to
Define Speech on Matters of Public Concern, 64 IND. L.J. 43, 75 (1988) (discuss-
ing the difficulty in applying the public concern test to employee speech).
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larly true in matters pertaining to academic speech because
courts have not adequately addressed when academic speech
constitutes a matter of public concern. 50 The Garcetti Court
emphasized they were not going to "constitutionalize the em-
ployee grievance." 15 1 As such, when faculty members at public
universities raise matters regarding, for example, tenure and
promotion decisions of an academic department, 152 the admin-
istration of a government grant, 153 or the administration of a
presidential search committee,154 federal courts have consi-
dered these matters to be employee grievances instead of mat-
ters of public concern. 155 These statements would therefore not
be entitled to First Amendment protection.
In Hong v. Grant, a federal district court held that a pro-
fessor was not entitled to First Amendment protection for re-
marks made during promotion and hiring decisions within the
department. 56 The professor made several remarks critical of
the department's tenure, salary increase, and hiring decisions,
and the department allegedly disciplined him for the re-
marks.15 7 The professor argued the statements were matters of
public concern because "they exposed government waste and
mismanagement." 58 But the court concluded these statements
were merely "internal administrative disputes which have little
or no relevance to the community as a whole."159 Such remarks
150. See R. Weston Donehower, Note, Boring Lessons: Defining the Limits
of a Teacher's First Amendment Right to Speak Through the Curriculum, 102
MICH. L. REV. 517, 528 (2003).
151. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983).
152. See, e.g., Hong v. Grant, 516 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1169-70 (C.D. Cal.
2007) (holding that a professor's remarks made during promotion and hiring
decisions within the department were not protected by the First Amendment
because they were not on matters of public concern).
153. See, e.g., Renken v. Gregory, 541 F.3d 769, 775 (7th Cir. 2008) (hold-
ing that a professor's speech was not protected by the First Amendment be-
cause criticizing a university for the handling of a grant was not a matter.of
public concern).
154. See, e.g., Gorum v. Sessoms, No. 06-565, 2008 WL 399641, at *5 (D.
Del. Feb. 12, 2008) (holding that a professor's remarks regarding the selection
of the university president did not warrant First Amendment protection).
155. See, e.g., Renken, 541 F.3d at 775; Hong, 516 F. Supp. 2d at 1169-70.
156. See Hong, 516 F. Supp. 2d at 1161-64, 1168.
157. See id. at 1161-64.
158. Id. at 1169.
159. Id. (citing Colburn v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 973 F.2d 581, 587 (7th Cir.
1992)).
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are not matters of public concern, and therefore, not worthy of
First Amendment protection. 160
Hong represents a trend among federal courts regarding
the application of the public concern requirement of the public
employee speech doctrine. Federal courts are unlikely to find a
professor engaged in speech on matters of public concern when
engaging in duties as a professor outside of academics' main-
stream teaching and scholarship requirements. 161 This is troub-
ling because even if the speech did not arise from employees'
official duties, the speech must still be on a matter of public
concern. Professors must therefore proceed at their own risk
when raising concerns about departmental matters and the
self-governance process, as courts could view this speech as
nothing more than employee grievances that fail to constitute a
matter of public concern.
2. Official Duties Test
After Garcetti, public employees are not entitled to First
Amendment protection for speech arising from their official du-
ties.162 This raises two equally important problems in the aca-
demic speech context. First, it is difficult to define a faculty
member's official duties. 163 Second, applying the official duties
test to academic speech could potentially produce a "chilling ef-
fect" on academic speech if private speech is subsumed into an
academic's official duties.164
The Supreme Court provided almost no guidance for defin-
ing when public employees make speech pursuant to their offi-
cial duties. The Garcetti Court explained it was not going to
outline a "comprehensive framework" for determining when an
employee speaks pursuant to their official duties. 165 But the
Court explained that courts should engage in a practical analy-
160. Id.
161. See, e.g., Renken v. Gregory, 541 F.3d 769, 775 (7th Cir. 2008); Piggee
v. Carl Sandburg Coll., 464 F.3d 667, 672 (7th Cir. 2006); Hong, 516 F. Supp.
2d at 1169-70.
162. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 426 (2006).
163. See Robert M. O'Neil, Academic Speech in the Post-Garcetti Environ-
ment, 7 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 1, 18 (2008) ("When it comes ... to 'official
duties,' the clarity with which a court can determine the responsibilities of an
assistant district attorney (or for that matter a non-faculty university em-
ployee like the outspoken Georgia financial aid counselor) simply does not ap-
ply to college professors.").
164. See Spurgeon, supra note 6, at 140 (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479, 487 (1960)).
165. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424.
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sis and avoid adhering strictly to formal job descriptions to
demonstrate an employee spoke pursuant to an official duty, as
employees' job duties often deviate from this description.166
Under the Court's reasoning in Garcetti, employers could po-
tentially include an endless amount of tasks under an em-
ployee's official duties.
This definitional problem is not unique to the academic
speech context. 167 But the nature of an academic's job amplifies
the problem. Unlike other types of public employment, it is dif-
ficult to define the official duties of an academic employed by a
public university because the duties of a professor could vary
widely and extend beyond what the employment contract
states.
The problems associated with defining an official duty be-
come apparent as federal courts increasingly apply Garcetti to
academic speech. Recently, the Third Circuit, in handling a
case of academic speech, explained that speech could arise from
an individual's official duties "if it relates to 'special knowledge'
or 'experience' acquired through his job."168 This definition of
official duties is problematic for academics who participate in
scholarly activities outside the public university. For example,
academics, especially law professors, are expanding the tradi-
tional mediums of scholarship to include electronic means such
as blogs.16 9 A reason for this expansion includes the ability to
disseminate the material to a larger audience.170 Many believe
blogs are making a positive contribution to legal scholarship,171
especially when they allow professors to participate in public
166. See id. at 424-25.
167. See, e.g., Joseph 0. Oluwole, Public Employment-Free Speech Juris-
prudence: A New Constitutional Test for Disciplined Whistleblowers, 19 U.
FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 421, 443 (2008) (discussing the Court's failure in Gar-
cetti to define what constitutes an employee's official duties).
168. Gorum v. Sessoms, 561 F.3d 179, 185 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that a
professor's speech, which included remarks made before a student-disciplinary
committee and student advising, was not protected by the First Amendment
because the speech arose out of his official duties).
169. See Adrienne E. Carter, Blogger Beware: Ethical Considerations for
Legal Blogs, 14 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 5, 4 (2007) ("Law professors use blogs to
reach out to their students and other faculty, and to engage in a discourse on
the nuances and developments within their specialties.").
170. See id. 1 5.
171. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Blogs and the Legal Academy, 84 WASH. U. L.
REV. 1127, 1127-28 (2006) (explaining that blogs created and maintained by
law professors can provide a positive addition to the legal community by allow-
ing law professors to become "public intellectuals" and participate in public
debates).
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debates outside of the ivory tower's walls. 172 Courts, though,
could classify this speech as relating to expertise obtained from
the academic's job.173 Under the Third Circuit's interpretation
of Garcetti, an academic would therefore make this speech pur-
suant to his official duties.174 Unfortunately, under this reason-
ing, almost anything could fall under a professor's official du-
ties, therefore rendering anything academics say or write
devoid of First Amendment protection.
In addition to the definitional problem, the official duties
test could have a significant chilling effect on academic speech
by classifying an academic's activities as part of her official du-
ties as long as the activities have some reasonable relationship
with the academic's position with the public university. When
faculty members engage in scholarship and teaching, which are
part of their official duties, the purpose of the public university
is frustrated if the public university disciplines faculty mem-
bers for their speech. The government could suppress a signifi-
cant amount of speech when an academic's private activities
have a relationship to the academic's official duties as faculty
member.175 This scenario is dangerous because public universi-
ties are the quintessential marketplace of ideas. 176 When the
public university suppresses ideas, it becomes difficult to find
another public forum to test competing ideas.
3. Viewpoint Discrimination
The application of the public employee speech doctrine to
academic speech is also problematic because it would allow the
government to regulate academic speech based on its view-
point. The First Amendment prohibits viewpoint discrimina-
tion.177 When the government is the speaker, though, the gov-
ernment can regulate speech based on its own viewpoint.178 In
172. Cf. id. at 1128.
173. See Gorum, 561 F.3d at 185 ("[A] claimant's speech might be consi-
dered part of his official duties if it relates to 'special knowledge' or 'expe-
rience' acquired through the job." (quoting Foraker v. Chaffinch, 501 F.3d 231,
240 (3d Cir. 2007))).
174. See id.
175. See id. at 185.
176. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
177. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828
(1995) ("It is axiomatic that the government may not regulate speech based on
its substantive content or the message it conveys.").
178. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193-94 (1991) (allowing recipients
of government funds to discriminate based on the scope of the government
grant).
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Garcetti, the Court explained that public employee speech is
government speech because the government pays for the speech
and controls the message delivered by the public employee. 179
But public universities hire academics because of their speech.
A primary duty of an academic employed by a public university
is to engage in scholarship and the dissemination of ideas,180
and thus academics would find it difficult to engage in an ex-
change of ideas when their ideas could be subject to viewpoint
discrimination.
Overall, the public employee speech doctrine poses numer-
ous problems in the context of public universities. The con-
straints placed on academic speech by the public employee
speech doctrine have the ability to stifle speech, thereby frus-
trating the principle of academic freedom within the public
university.
B. APPLYING THE GOVERNMENT SPEECH DOCTRINE TO
ACADEMIC SPEECH
In Garcetti, the Court explained that public employee
speech is government speech because the government paid for
the speech and the government selected what message to deliv-
er.181 While the Court appeared to rely on Rust to support this
view, 182 Justice Souter, in his dissent, critiqued the Court's use
of the government speech doctrine. 183
Justice Souter explained that while some public employee
speech may be government speech, other public employee
speech does not fall into this category.184 Notably, "[s]ome pub-
lic employees are hired to 'promote a particular policy' by
broadcasting a particular message set by the government, but
not everyone working for the government, after all, is hired to
179. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421-22 (2006).
180. See O'Neil, supra note 163, at 18.
181. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421-22 ("Restricting speech that owes its ex-
istence to a public employee's professional responsibilities . . . simply reflects
the exercise of employer control over what the employer itself has commis-
sioned or created."); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Teaching that Speech Mat-
ters: A Framework for Analyzing Speech Issues in Schools, 42 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 825, 834 (2009) (explaining that in public school "government speech cas-
es, the government is not regulating the speech of those outside the govern-
ment-it is just choosing the message that it wants to adopt").
182. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422 (citing Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833).
183. Id. at 436-39 (Souter, J., dissenting).
184. Id. at 437.
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speak from a government manifesto."185 Souter explained the
facts in Garcetti and Rust varied regarding the duties of each
employee.186 The government in Rust required fund recipients
to espouse a "substantive position prescribed by the govern-
ment in advance" while the government in Garcetti did not re-
quire its employees to promote such a message. 187 In Garcetti,
Ceballos worked as a deputy district attorney, and there was no
prearranged government message for him to present. 188 Con-
versely, in Rust, there was a coherent government message
which all recipients were to follow. 1 8 9 Specifically, health care
workers receiving Title X funds were required to espouse a cer-
tain message prescribed by the government regarding abortion
and birth control.190
Academic speech is less analogous to the speech of tradi-
tional public employees because universities do not hire aca-
demics to promote a specific government message. 191 Universi-
ties provide funding to academics to teach and produce
scholarship.192 Universities do not exercise control over aca-
demic scholarship and teaching the way a traditional public
employer exercises control over its employees.193 Indeed, con-
trary to Garcetti, an academic's status as a public employee is
more similar to the public funding of lawyers described in Ve-
lazquez, where the government provided federal funding to
lawyers offering free legal services to indigent clients. 194 The
Court explained that the lawyers receiving the government
funding were not speaking as agents of the government because
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See id.
188. Id.
189. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 178-81 (1990).
190. See id.
191. See Bezanson & Buss, supra note 147, at 1436 (observing that aca-
demic tenure is a process "clearly not governed by an intention of the [univer-
sity] to speak an independent message through the voices of approved faculty
scholarship"); Secunda, supra note 147, at 1813 ("[N]o one would seriously ar-
gue that public university professors are hired to parrot a particular govern-
ment message.").
192. See Bezanson & Buss, supra note 147, at 1435.
193. See Frederick Schauer, Is There a Right to Academic Freedom?, 77 U.
COLO. L. REv. 907, 911 (2006) ("[A]n employee of the district attorney's of-
fice ... might be required in the course of her job as a lawyer to make certain
arguments and avoid others . . . [but] such restrictions may not be constitu-
tionally permissible for academics when engaged in their academic activi-
ties . . . .").
194. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 536 (2001).
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Congress gave the money to the lawyers to convey private mes-
sages. 9 5 Academics employed by public universities are also
not speaking as agents of the government because the universi-
ty provides them with a salary to convey private messages in
the form of their scholarship.196
The Court also noted in Velazquez that government restric-
tions on the speech of lawyers receiving federal funding pre-
vented these lawyers from engaging in their "traditional role"
as an advocate. 97 Similar to Velazquez, when the government
is able to exercise complete control over academic speech, it de-
stroys the fundamental function of a university-to advance
academic freedom.198
Moreover, analyzing academic speech closely under the
government speech doctrine, it is apparent that academic
speech does not represent true government speech because the
university does not disseminate a coherent message. 199 Instead,
the government is funding faculty to act as private speakers
and to create private messages through their scholarship. 200 In
the public employee speech context, the government hires pub-
lic employees to promote a governmental message, and the gov-
ernment regulates this message. 201 For example, in a state at-
torney general's office, the state does not hire assistant
attorneys general to promote their own policy preferences or ob-
jectives, but rather to assist the attorney general in carrying
out the policies of the office and the interests of the state. 202
195. See id. at 540-43.
196. See Elrod, supra note 10, at 64 ("[Professors] are paid to develop theo-
ries and to speak, write, and teach about their intellectual labors in all steps of
the creation, dissemination, and reformulation of those ideas.").
197. See Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 544 ("Restricting [Legal Services Corpora-
tion] attorneys in advising their clients and in presenting arguments and ana-
lyses to the courts distorts the legal system by altering the traditional role of
the attorneys. . . .").
198. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 836
(1995) (explaining that universities serve as "vital centers for the Nation's in-
tellectual life").
199. See Elrod, supra note 10, at 63 ("The university environment is one
that invites and encourages verbal exchanges, including those that are filled
with disagreement and disputations between and among those who work, vis-
it, and study there.").
200. See id. at 64.
201. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421-22 (2006) ("Restricting
speech that owes its existence to a public employee's professional responsibili-
ties . .. simply reflects the exercise of employer control over what the employer
itself has commissioned or created.").
202. This fact pattern is similar to the situation in Garcetti, in which the
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The public employer continuously regulates the content of its
employees' speech to ensure that assistant attorneys general
align their speech with the policies of the office.203 Contrary to
this situation, when public universities hire faculty, these fa-
culty are not hired for the sole purpose of speaking for the gov-
ernment-specifically, the public university.204 While faculty
members may be required to assist the government in promot-
ing and fostering an environment of scholarly learning, the
public university hires them with the intent that they will
teach and engage in scholarship. 205
Applying the principles of academic freedom, the universi-
ty often does not regulate the content of faculty members'
teaching and scholarship.206 Although the university regulates
the teaching and scholarship of academics in terms of tenure
and promotion decisions, the regulation of an academic's work
is not subject to the same kind of scrutiny as public employees
working in other government entities. If academics' scholarship
were subject to regulation by the government, academic free-
dom-something the Supreme Court has acknowledged as ex-
isting within the public university-would be jeopardized. 207
In addition to considering the amount of control govern-
ment employers have over the messages disseminated by public
employees, it is also important to consider why such control is
necessary in most government entities, but not in the public
university. The Court explained in Garcetti that editorial con-
trol is necessary to ensure that the government can clearly
communicate its policies without interference from subordinate
employees and that the government can effectively carry out its
public employee was a deputy district attorney. See id. at 422 ("When [Cebal-
los] went to work and performed the tasks he was paid to perform, Ceballos
acted as a government employee. The fact that his duties sometimes required
him to speak or write does not mean his supervisors were prohibited from eva-
luating his performance.").
203. See id. at 423-24.
204. See Elrod, supra note 10, at 64.
205. See id.
206. See Schauer, supra note 193, at 911 ("It is often claimed that a teacher
or professor has an individual right against her public educational institution
to teach (and a fortiori, to write) what she pleases in the classroom, regardless
of instructions to the contrary from department chairs, principals, deans, pres-
idents, and even. . . faculty committees.").
207. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (ex-
plaining the importance of academic freedom and the existence of a market-
place of ideas in the public university); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S.
234, 250 (1957) (explaining the importance of intellectual freedom within the
public university).
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public services. 208 The public employee speech doctrine fails to
consider the fact that the policies of the public university may
differ from those of other government entities.
The public university is vastly different from any other
government entity.20 9 When students attend a public universi-
ty, they enter with the intent to receive an education. 210 The
university serves as a marketplace of ideas. 211 Within this in-
stitution, academics present students with a "robust exchange
of ideas" in an effort to further this marketplace. 212 If this is the
purpose of the modern public university, then government con-
trol over the ideas presented by academics makes no sense. For
these reasons, it is difficult to conclude that the university acts
as a coherent messenger for the purposes of disseminating a
specific message.
C. USING THE PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE TO REGULATE THE
CONTENT OF SPEECH
The government cannot engage in viewpoint discrimination
when it creates a public forum.213 But the government can en-
gage in permissible content regulation when this regulation
preserves the purpose of the forum. 214 When considering the
amount of control universities can exercise over speech within
the institution, courts often resort to a forum analysis because
the university most closely represents a public forum created
by the government. 215 Using a forum analysis, the government
can engage in permissible content discrimination. 216
208. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418-19.
209. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003) ("We have long rec-
ognized that given the important purpose of speech and thought associated
with the university environment, universities occupy a special niche in our
constitutional tradition.").
210. See Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603.
211. See id.
212. Id.
213. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
829 (1995) (explaining that the state may not engage in viewpoint discrimina-
tion in a "limited public forum ... of its own creation").
214. See id. at 830 ("[C]ontent discrimination ... may be permissible if it
preserves the purposes of [a] limited forum ... [unlike] viewpoint discrimina-
tion, which is presumed impermissible when directed against speech other-
wise within the forum's limitations.").
215. See, e.g., id. at 829-30 (applying a forum analysis to a university stu-
dent activities fee system).
216. See id. at 830.
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Public universities have tenure requirements for their fa-
culty members, and when academics employed by these institu-
tions do not meet such requirements, the universities can ter-
minate their employment. 217 Public universities must be able to
regulate the quality of the scholarship produced by faculty
members or else public universities would be forced to continue
to employ mediocre faculty. 218 Content regulations allow the
university to regulate the quality of academic speech. The uni-
versity tenure process is similar to the process employed by the
NEA in Finley in that both institutions consider the quality of
an applicant's work in determining whether to convey tenure or
a grant, respectively. 219
Finley does not provide a clean analogy to the university
tenure situation, however, because the Court did not address
whether Congress created a forum when it created funding for
the arts.220 Finley suggests, though, that the government can
make distinctions based on the content of speech in certain cir-
cumstances. 221 Like the competitive grant-application process
in Finley, university tenure and promotion decisions are also a
competitive process. Further, as in Finley, the use of content-
based considerations within the tenure process is a conse-
quence of the process itself. Professors within academic de-
partments must make subjective evaluations of fellow profes-
sors' tenure applications. While these evaluations often use
certain fixed criteria, the nature of the process leads to content-
based evaluations.
217. See Bezanson & Buss, supra note 147, at 918.
218. See id. (arguing that there is "little doubt" that a public university
would be able to deny employment or tenure to a professor who taught con-
spiracy theories about Brown v. Board of Education).
219. See Randall P. Bezanson, Performing Art: National Endowment for
the Arts v. Finley, 60 FED. COMM. L.J. 535, 574 (2008) ("Public university fa-
culties make tenure decisions in much the same fashion as the NEA panels,
and those decisions are explicitly focused on the quality of published scholar-
ship (including art or music or dance) and the quality of (the art of?) teach-
ing."); Randall P. Bezanson, The Government Speech Forum: Forbes and Fin-
ley and Government Speech Selection Judgments, 83 IOWA L. REV. 953, 978
(1998) ("[Tlhe NEA's claim was even closer to that of a university selecting fa-
culty for tenure, a highly discretionary judgment deeply imbedded in process,
distributed to assigned decision makers, and geared toward favoring certain
forms of quality and content in the expressive interest of pursuing the institu-
tion's teaching or research goals.").
220. See Brownstein, supra note 126, at 788 (discussing the "nonforum
analysis" used by the Court in Finley).
221. See id.
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In general, applying the public speech doctrine to academic
speech is inappropriate because the university acts more like a
public forum for the dissemination of various messages articu-
lated by academics instead of a coherent messenger of a gov-
ernment message. Given the university's strong resemblance to
a public forum in this regard, it makes sense that courts should
treat speech occurring within this forum-like setting differently
than public employee speech.
III. USING THE PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE TO
DETERMINE FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION FOR
ACADEMIC SPEECH
The public employee speech doctrine is not an appropriate
doctrine for regulating academic speech in public universities,
as academic speech does not represent pure government
speech. Academic speech does not represent pure government
speech because the public university does not act as a coherent
messenger requiring its faculty members to disseminate a spe-
cific message. Despite this difference, academic speech is not
necessarily private speech, as the public university is a gov-
ernment entity, and the government provides faculty members
with a forum in which to disseminate their speech. Drawing on
public forum jurisprudence, this Part proposes a model for gov-
ernment regulation of academic speech. This Part explains that
the public forum doctrine, instead of the public employee
speech doctrine, should regulate academic speech. A forum ap-
proach to academic speech would balance the interests of both
the government and academics by allowing the public universi-
ty to regulate the content and quality of faculty members'
speech but not the viewpoint of such speech.222 Finally, this
Part contends that using the public forum doctrine to regulate
academic speech is more consistent with First Amendment ju-
risprudence. 223
222. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
829-30 (1995).
223. See Nahmod, supra note 85, at 68 ("[A] lack of First Amendment pro-
tection [for professional academic freedom] would be inconsistent with the de-
mocracy-promoting purposes of higher education: the ability to engage in mor-
al reasoning or, more broadly, the development of critical intellectual faculties
and the advancement of knowledge.").
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A. THE PUBLIC FORUM MODEL AND ACADEMIC SPEECH
Academic speech requires a substantial amount of protec-
tion under the First Amendment, but there are legitimate rea-
sons for government regulation of this speech. The public uni-
versity hires faculty to teach specific courses, and it expects
faculty to teach these courses. 224 The public university also
should not grant tenure to or promote an academic who does
not produce scholarship that meets the scholarly standards of
the academic's respective discipline. 225 Given the public univer-
sity's interest in supervising academic speech and protecting
academics' First Amendment interests, any model regulating
academic speech must balance these competing interests. Un-
der the public forum model, the type of forum would dictate the
level of constitutional scrutiny given to restrictions placed on
academic speech by a public university. Often, faculty will find
themselves in a limited public forum.226 Using the Court's rea-
soning in Rosenberger and Finley, the university can impose
content and quality regulations on speech within this forum,
but the university cannot discipline faculty for their view-
points.227
The need for a distinction between viewpoint regulation
and content or quality regulation is important. 228 Content regu-
224. William G. Buss, Academic Freedom and Freedom of Speech: Commu-
nicating the Curriculum, 2 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 213, 218-19 (1999) ("Of
course, no one argues that when I am hired to teach Constitutional Law, I may
go into the classroom. . . and teach Estate Planning.").
225. See Nahmod, supra note 85, at 73 ("[There are also legitimate educa-
tional constraints on professorial scholarship under the First Amendment.
Perhaps the main constraint is scholarly standards. The university as employ-
er is surely entitled to evaluate a professor's fitness through the application of
well-established scholarly standards.").
226. See, e.g., Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828-30 (holding that a public uni-
versity created a limited public forum when it created a student fee system to
fund student organizations); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267-68 (1981)
(holding that public university facilities are limited public forums when the
university opens these facilities to student groups).
227. See Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 571 (1997)
(finding that a "content-based [artistic] 'excellence' threshold" in public arts
funding does not threaten impermissible viewpoint discrimination); Rosen-
berger, 515 U.S. at 830 ("[C]ontent discrimination ... may be permissible if it
preserves the purposes of [a] limited public forum . . . [unlike] viewpoint dis-
crimination, which is presumed impermissible when directed against speech
otherwise within the forum's limitations.").
228. See Elrod, supra note 10, at 4 ("[I]f the principles of academic freedom,
the fundamental democratic values of the First Amendment, the purposes of
public higher education, and the functions of a professor are to coexist mea-
ningfully, then the speech of public university academics, directly related to
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lations would allow the university to discipline the faculty
member who does not teach material related to the specific
course they are required to teach. 229 The obvious situation
would be when a university hires a law professor to teach civil
procedure and they teach business associations instead.230 A
more subtle and common situation occurs when the university
hires a law professor to teach constitutional law, but instead,
he or she decides to spend most of the time discussing criminal
rights.231 Further, quality regulations would allow a public uni-
versity to discipline or terminate the employment of a faculty
member whose scholarship does not meet the scholarly re-
quirements of his or her respective discipline 232 or whose teach-
ing does not meet an acceptable level of quality.233
There are at least three notable benefits to using a forum
analysis to regulate academic speech. First, a forum analysis
does not require scholars and jurists to determine whether aca-
demic freedom is a constitutional right. Though a significant
amount of literature debates the merits of academic freedom as
a constitutional right,234 the public forum analysis only re-
quires that academics not disseminate a coherent message from
the government. If academics' messages became coherent mes-
their area of scholarship, must be afforded ample 'breathing space,' even if this
requires a new or unique subcategory of speech: academic speech."); Rebecca
Gose Lynch, Comment, Pawns of the State or Priests of Democracy? Analyzing
Professors'Academic Freedom Rights Within the State's Managerial Realm, 91
CAL. L. REV. 1061, 1082 (2003) ("After finding that the academic speech lies
within the state's managerial domain, a court should ask whether the restric-
tion of the professor's speech is functionally necessary to accomplish the uni-
versity's goals.").
229. See Alan K. Chen, Bureaucracy and Distrust: Germaneness and the
Paradoxes of the Academic Freedom Doctrine, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 955, 967
(2006) ("By definition, curricular decisions are a form of subject matter dis-
crimination. A university's requirement that its chemistry professors teach
organic chemistry, and not political science, is content based . . .
230. See id.
231. See id.
232. See id. ("Universities and professors also regularly engage in all sorts
of content discrimination in the evaluation of the work of the faculty and the
student body.").
233. See id.; Schauer, supra note 193, at 917 ("A university could certainly
take adverse employment action against a professor who is inarticulate and
confusing in his classroom delivery or whose scholarly arguments are gibbe-
rish, illogical, or not based on sound research. That is surely content-
selectivity-it involves base discrimination against bad teaching, poor re-
search, and incoherent writing.").
234. See, e.g., Byrne, supra note 140, at 256-58; DeMitchell & Connelly,
supra note 140, at 83.
[94:12021234
2010] ACADEMIC SPEECH AFTER GARCETTI
sages attributed to the government, then the speech would fall
under the purview of the government speech doctrine. 235
Second, a forum analysis avoids the complications posed by
creating an exception to Garcetti for academic speech. Even
with such an exception, academics would still have to contend
with the public concern test established by Pickering and Con-
nick.2 36 Such a restriction could compromise academic speech.
A forum analysis avoids this problem.
Third, existing First Amendment jurisprudence supports
using a public forum analysis to regulate academic speech.
Courts frequently apply a forum analysis to consider whether
public university regulation of speech, especially student
speech, is permissible under the First Amendment. 237 Consid-
eration of the government speech doctrine clearly demonstrates
that academic speech does not fall within the purview of this
doctrine, as the public university is not a coherent messenger of
a government message. Rather, the public university is more
akin to a forum where the government funds academics to dis-
seminate private messages. The public forum doctrine, there-
fore, is a more appropriate doctrine for regulating academic
speech.
Despite these benefits, the use of a public forum analysis is
not without criticism. Critics of a distinction between viewpoint
and content regulations for academic speech explain that public
university administrators should be able to discipline profes-
sors for espousing views that are contrary to generally accepted
ideas,238 even if this results in viewpoint discrimination. 239 Un-
der this view, for example, a public university could discipline a
235. See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421-22 (2006); Rust v.
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193-94 (1990).
236. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983); Pickering v. Bd. of
Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 571-72 (1968).
237. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.
819, 828-30 (1995).
238. See Schauer, supra note 193, at 918 (explaining how a distinction be-
tween content and viewpoint regulation of academic speech would mean that
"a law professor may be sanctioned for teaching torts in her Constitutional
Law class [but not] be sanctioned for teaching that Plessy v. Ferguson was
rightly decided or that the First Amendment is a fundamentally bad idea").
239. See id. ("Consider the case in which, whether in class or in an academ-
ic book or article, a professor argues that the decision in Brown v. Board of
Education was the product of a conspiracy among the Communist Party, the
NAACP, and the Jews. There should be little doubt that espousing such a
viewpoint would be permissible grounds for non-hiring, and permissible
grounds for non-tenuring.").
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faculty member who discussed in his courses and scholarship
that the United States government carried out the terrorist at-
tacks on September 11th.240 Under a forum analysis, this would
be an instance of viewpoint discrimination, even if this idea
were contrary to the generally accepted fact that terrorists car-
ried out the events of September 11th. Therefore, the universi-
ty could not regulate this speech.241 There are problems with
this critique, though. By contrast, if public universities are able
to suppress the speech of those who express ideas contrary to
generally accepted ideas, then the university is guilty of silenc-
ing the "marketplace of ideas."24 2 Often, if an idea is not widely
accepted, superior ideas will eventually silence it as an inferior
idea. 24 3 More directly, the forum analysis also allows dissident
ideas within a discipline to be overcome. Moreover, when the
university considers the academic expressing the dissident idea
for tenure or promotion, the university will be able to engage in
content and quality discrimination when evaluating the aca-
demic's scholarship and teaching in accordance with the dis-
cussion above.244
B. APPLYING THE PUBLIC FORUM MODEL TO OTHER
INSTITUTIONS
Using a public forum model to balance the First Amend-
ment interests of faculty members and the interests of the pub-
lic university would still allow the government to exercise an
extensive amount of authority over speech in other public edu-
cational settings such as elementary and secondary schools.
The interests and functions of elementary and secondary
schools are vastly different from the functions of the public
university.24 5 Current First Amendment jurisprudence recog-
240. See, e.g., Melissa Sowry, Lecturer Under Fire for 9/11 Conspiracy Be-
lief, ABC NEWS, July 25, 2006, http://abcnews.go.com/US/Story?id=2233348&
page=1.
241. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828-30 (barring viewpoint discrimination
in a limited public forum).
242. See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) ('Teachers
and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to eva-
luate .... ).
243. See id.
244. See Chen, supra note 229, at 967.
245. See Frederick Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amend-
ment, 112 HARv. L. REV. 84, 117 (1998) ("Although not all, and not even most,
educational institutions are research universities, a wide sociological, cultural,
and functional gulf exists between the primary or secondary school and the
research university.").
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nizes these differences and uses them to regulate speech within
these two different settings accordingly.246 Consequently, the
government will always be able to regulate the content of
speech within grade schools.
Courts frequently classify forums within elementary and
secondary schools as nonpublic forums because schools often
limit speech within these schools. 247 This limitation is appro-
priate because the age of the students within these schools
gives the government a legitimate reason to limit speech there-
in.24 8 This classification limits the speech of both students and
teachers. In regards to students, the Supreme Court restricted
students' speech rights in nonpublic forums when it held in
Hazelwood that school publications were nonpublic forums, and
therefore, the school could regulate the content within these
publications as long as the regulation reasonably related to "le-
gitimate pedagogical concerns."249 Lower federal courts also use
the reasoning in Hazelwood to limit the free speech rights of
secondary school teachers. 250 As a result, the speech of second-
ary school teachers, unlike speech in public universities, is
more likely to be the speech of the government.251 Unlike aca-
demics in public universities, teachers in elementary and sec-
ondary schools do not have a significant amount of control over
the curriculum within their classroom.252 State legislatures and
246. See, e.g., Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 238 n.4 (Souter,
J., concurring) ("[Clases dealing with the right of teaching institutions to limit
expressive freedom of students have been confined to high schools . . . whose
students and their schools' relation to them are different and at least arguably
distinguishable from their counterparts in higher education." (citations omit-
ted)).
247. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267-70 (1998).
248. See id. at 271 ("Educators are entitled to exercise greater control
over ... student expression [in high school sponsored activities] to assure
that ... [student] readers or listeners are not exposed to material that may be
inappropriate for their level of maturity.").
249. See id. at 273.
250. See Neal H. Hutchens, Silence at the Schoolhouse Gate: The Diminish-
ing First Amendment Rights of Public School Employees, 97 KY. L.J. 37, 66-67
(2008) ("Hazelwood has often served as a basis for substantially restricting
teachers' First Amendment rights in the classroom.").
251. See, e.g., R. George Wright, The Emergence of First Amendment Aca-
demic Freedom, 85 NEB. L. REV. 793, 825 n.180 (2007) (identifying major cases
in which federal courts deemed elementary and secondary teachers' speech to
be government speech).
252. See Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 910 F.2d 1172, 1176 (3d Cir.
1990) ("[N]o court has found that [primary and secondary school] teachers'
First Amendment rights extend to choosing their own curriculum . .. in con-
travention of school policy or dictates.").
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local school boards make most curricular choices in elementary
and secondary schools. 253 These curricular choices include text-
book selection and course content. Conversely, at the university
level, individual faculty members handle most of these deci-
sions.254 Given the limited free speech rights of elementary and
secondary education teachers, there is not a strong basis to ar-
gue that grade schools create forums for teachers to deviate
from the established curricular plan or to integrate their own
views into the classroom.
CONCLUSION
Applying the public employee speech doctrine to academic
speech is inappropriate. When the government creates a public
university, part of the bargain is academic freedom. Although
the source of academic speech is the government because the
government paid for the speech, academic speech is not neces-
sarily analogous to traditional public employee speech. The
public university is not a coherent messenger of government
speech, but rather, more like a public forum for the dissemina-
tion of various private messages. Consequently, courts should
apply a public forum analysis instead of the public employee
speech doctrine to academic speech to determine whether regu-
lation by public universities of academic speech is permissible
under the First Amendment. A public forum approach to aca-
demic speech is more appropriate under current First Amend-
ment jurisprudence. Overall, this approach balances the inter-
ests of both the public university in regulating its employees
and the First Amendment interests of academics while safe-
guarding the important principle of academic freedom.
253. See Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982) ("This Court has
long recognized that local school boards have broad discretion in the manage-
ment of school affairs.").
254. See Chen, supra note 229, at 967.
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